Does duration of deregulated religious markets affect Church attendance? Evidence from twenty-six religious markets in Europe and North America between 1981 and 2006 by Aarts, Olav et al.
  
 University of Groningen
Does duration of deregulated religious markets affect Church attendance? Evidence from
twenty-six religious markets in Europe and North America between 1981 and 2006
Aarts, Olav; Need, Ariana; Grotenhuis, Manfred Te; Graaf, Nan Dirk de
Published in:
Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 49(4), pp.657-672.
IMPORTANT NOTE: You are advised to consult the publisher's version (publisher's PDF) if you wish to cite from
it. Please check the document version below.
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Publication date:
2010
Link to publication in University of Groningen/UMCG research database
Citation for published version (APA):
Aarts, O., Need, A., Grotenhuis, M. T., & Graaf, N. D. D. (2010). Does duration of deregulated religious
markets affect Church attendance? Evidence from twenty-six religious markets in Europe and North
America between 1981 and 2006. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 49(4), pp.657-672., 49(4),
657-672.
Copyright
Other than for strictly personal use, it is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the
author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons).
Take-down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Downloaded from the University of Groningen/UMCG research database (Pure): http://www.rug.nl/research/portal. For technical reasons the
number of authors shown on this cover page is limited to 10 maximum.
Download date: 12-11-2019
Does Duration of Deregulated Religious Markets
Affect Church Attendance? Evidence from 26
Religious Markets in Europe and North America








Institute for Innovation and Governance Studies
University of Twente
NAN DIRK DE GRAAF
Nuffield College
Oxford University
This study tests the deregulation hypothesis of religious market theory in 26 European and Northern American
countries by examining differences in religious involvement between and within countries. The deregulation
hypothesis, which is assumed to be universally valid, predicts that religious involvement is higher in deregulated
religious markets. Moreover, countries having deregulated religious markets for a longer period of time are
supposed to have higher levels of involvement. Therefore, we test the duration hypothesis. This test is important,
as it also has been argued that it may take time for deregulation to have an effect on religious involvement.
Multilevel analysis on the stacked European and World Value Surveys of 1981, 1990, 2000, and 2006 show
that deregulation fosters church attendance, but duration of deregulation does not increase church attendance.
Although the deregulation hypothesis cannot be rejected, we find that modernization corrodes church attendance
to a larger extent than deregulation can stimulate church attendance.
INTRODUCTION
Since Stark and Bainbridge (1985) introduced the religious market theory over two decades
ago, scholars have remained very interested in the relationship between the supply of religious
goods and religious vitality (Finke and Stark 1988; Iannaccone 1991; Stark 1997; Stark and
Finke 2000). Religious market theory—sometimes labeled as a new paradigm (Warner 1993)—
relates religious involvement to the structure of religious markets: in more free and diverse
markets, religious life is expected to be more vibrant (Stark and Finke 2000). One of the core
hypotheses concerns state regulation. This hypothesis predicts that the less a state regulates its
religious market, the greater individual religious involvement will be within that market (Chaves,
Schraeder, and Sprindys 1994:1088; Iannaccone, Finke, and Stark 1997:351). The assumption
is that strict regulation of a religious market allows religious firms to be lax, indolent, and
complacent since the clergy enjoy a secure income irrespective of performance. As a result, the
religious options for individuals to choose from will be limited and religious involvement will
be low in countries with a strong regulation of the religious market. Religious deregulation is
therefore regarded as a major driving force to increase religious involvement (Bruce 1999; Finke
1997; Stark and Iannaccone 1996).
The deregulation hypothesis has been tested in several ways, but we point out two important
shortcomings. First, tests so far have primarily focused on the degree of religious deregulation,
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neglecting the duration of religious deregulation (Barro and McCleary 2003; Chaves and Cann
1992; Norris and Inglehart 2004). Second, empirical research on religious regulation focused on
differences between countries (Barro and McCleary 2003; Chaves and Cann 1992; Iannaccone
1991; Norris and Inglehart 2004), whereas the deregulation hypothesis is foremost a hypothesis
about the religious market and trends of religious variation within countries.
When a state, for whatever reason, no longer supports claims of exclusive legitimacy made
by the existing monopolistic religion, its religious leaders can no longer afford to be lax and
take their congregations for granted (Stark and Iannaccone 1994). In this new situation, the
clergy have to work harder to attract and bind their members. As a presumed consequence, this
investment will raise levels of involvement. Hence, the deregulation hypothesis is about changes
in the structure of the religious market within a country. Nevertheless, it makes sense to compare
various countries as well because the structure of religious markets differs between countries.
In this study, we will test the presumed positive effect of both the degree and the duration of
deregulation between countries as well as within countries.
To test the deregulation hypothesis, we use the European and World Value Surveys held in
1981, 1990, 2000, and 2006. In total, 26 countries were selected for analyses. To measure state
regulation, we also make use of data originating from the International Coalition for Religious
Freedom archives. The main focus of this study is on the relationship between deregulation
of the religious market and religious involvement. Furthermore, deregulation is split into two
distinct aspects: degree of deregulation and the duration of deregulation. Accordingly, the research
question reads:
To what extent do the degree and the duration of a deregulated religious market positively affect individual
religious involvement within and between European and Northern American countries between 1981 and 2006?
PREVIOUS RESEARCH
Empirical research testing the deregulation hypothesis shows inconclusive findings. This may
be due to different sampling strategies and the use of different indicators for deregulation and
religious involvement. This, of course, makes it difficult to compare the results of these studies.
As Chaves and Cann (1992) have already made clear, comparing different studies is further
complicated because some researchers used the degree of religious diversity as a substitute for
religious deregulation in testing the impact of the market structure. Religious diversity might,
indeed, be a consequence of deregulation, and one may expect that diversity fosters religious
participation as well. Hence, although being different indicators of the market structure, both
deregulation and religious diversity should have a positive impact on religious participation.
Iannaccone (1991) used religious concentration, expressed in the Herfindahl index, as a
measure for diversity in the market structure. He showed that church attendance in 12 Protestant
nations is substantially higher in more diverse markets. By contrast, Chaves and Cann (1992),
also using the Herfindahl index and the same 12 Protestant nations while adding six Catholic
nations, found no relationship between diversity and religious involvement. Arguing that religious
concentration is not a valid measure for religious regulation, they developed a six-point scale
measuring the degree of religious regulation. This scale directly refers to state interferences with
religious organizations and therefore is an appropriate measurement of religious regulation. Using
this more adequate measure of religious regulation, Chaves and Cann showed that state regulation
negatively influences religious involvement.
Barro and McCleary (2003) came to similar conclusions using the Herfindahl index and the
regulation measure developed by Chaves and Cann. They examined monthly religious attendance
in 59 countries and found that a state religion (being a religious monopoly) increased involvement,
whereas religious regulation lowered involvement. This is a rather odd outcome as state religion
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and regulation are quite strongly positively related in their study. However, their results indicate
that there might be some truth in the deregulation hypothesis.
Chaves, Schraeder, and Sprindys (1994) examined 18 Western countries to test whether
religious regulation affected Muslims minorities. Their findings showed that when a religious
market is more regulated, religious involvement is lower among Muslims, now expressed by the
Hajj Rate for Muslims per 100,000 of the total population. Thus, using yet another measure of
state regulation, the deregulation hypothesis was again confirmed.
Norris and Inglehart (2004) refined the regulation scale of Chaves and Cann by adding 14
new items. Examining 21 nations in 2004 (many of which were already in the 1992 sample
of Chaves and Cann), they found no evidence to support the deregulation hypothesis. In their
analysis, they used no less than four different indicators of state regulation. Norris and Inglehart
concluded that religious deregulation does not significantly increase a nation’s mean frequency
of attendance at religious services. To conclude, the use of measures for religious regulation and
measures for religious diversity provided mixed results.
Still, findings that do not support the religious deregulation hypothesis may be explained by
arguing that the onset of increased religious involvement due to deregulation takes some time
(Stark and Finke 2000; Stark and Iannaccone 1994:236). An obvious next step, then, is to test
this “time-lag” auxiliary assumption. This can be done in two ways. First, differences in duration
between countries might explain differences in religious involvement. Second, the duration of
deregulation within countries might explain changes in religious involvement. Analyzing dif-
ferences within nations is, of course, a more stringent test of the deregulation hypothesis than
analyzing differences between nations.
In conjunction with the duration of religious deregulation, we consider the influence of the
degree of deregulation on religious involvement. We determine if there are nonlinear effects of
duration of religious deregulation and whether duration and the degree of deregulation interact
with each other. Furthermore, possible confounding influences of modernization and communism
are taken into account. Finally, we control for compositional effects. This is done at the end of the
analyses to give the predictions of the religious market theory the best possible chance to prove
their value.
Religious market theory, in general, asserts that changes in a religious economy affect the
behavior of individuals. Thus, changes on a higher level—the religious market—will result in
changes in the behavior of individuals (Finke 1997; Stark and Finke 2000). However, research
testing the deregulation hypothesis quite often used aggregated data on religious involvement,
assuming that all individuals within a higher level unit (such as countries or waves) have equal
religious involvement (Barro and McCleary 2003; Chaves and Cann 1992; Finke, Guest, and Stark
1996; Finke and Stark 1988; Iannaccone 1991; Norris and Inglehart 2004; Stark and Iannaccone
1994, 1996). However, it is reasonable to assume that there is considerable individual variation
in church attendance. Thus, by aggregating, this individual variation is lost by default. Therefore,
we examine religious involvement on the individual level to investigate the relationship between
religious deregulation and involvement.
HYPOTHESES ON THE DEREGULATION OF RELIGION
General Patterns in Religious Deregulation
According to religious market theory, in highly regulated religious markets, all religious
preferences cannot be adequately satisfied. As a result, levels of religious involvement will be
relatively low. In a completely deregulated religious economy, the market is free and open, and
religious firms are invested in attracting and keeping their adherents (Finke and Stark 1988; Stark
and Iannaccone 1994). Since the clergy in this more open market cannot guarantee that a large
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number of clientele will always visit their church, they have to make a considerable effort to
attract and bind their members. In the long run, these efforts are presumed to result in higher
levels of religious involvement. Therefore, deregulated markets will have higher attendance rates
than regulated markets.1 Correspondingly, the hypothesis on the degree of religious deregulation
pertaining to differences between countries reads:
Hypothesis 1: Individuals living in countries with a higher degree of deregulation of the
religious market attend religious services more often than individuals living
in countries with lower levels of deregulation.
As countries deregulate, religious markets open up and, as a result, levels of religious
involvement will rise (Stark and Finke 2000). We thus argue that the longer a country has had a
deregulated religious market, the stronger individual religious involvement in that country will
be. However, there is presumed to be a time lag between religious deregulation and the onset of
increased religious involvement (Stark and Iannaccone 1994). Stability or any decline in religious
involvement after religious deregulation can be temporary (Stark and Iannaccone 1994:234) since
it may take time for religious firms to get used to the principles of a free-market economy, that is,
it takes some time for the clergy to adapt and implement strategies to advertise their “products”
(Stark and Iannaccone 1994). It is most likely that religious deregulation, therefore, does not have
an instant effect. In general, once religious deregulation takes place, religious involvement within
a country is presumed to increase over time (Stark and Finke 2000).
Although religious market theory does not specify the duration of this time lag, we refine the
deregulation hypothesis by incorporating the influence of duration of religious deregulation on
religious involvement. To avoid the risk of refuting the deregulation hypothesis because of a too-
restricted time frame, we do not specify the exact time before deregulation takes effect. Instead,
we will test the religious deregulation hypothesis assuming that the adjustment process is gradual
and will allow for possible start-up processes before deregulation affects church attendance.
Duration of religious deregulation differs from country to country because deregulation was
not introduced in all countries at the same time. Some countries have a record of deregulation
for well over 200 years, while others have no, or a very short, history of deregulation. Following
religious market theory, countries with religious markets that were deregulated many years ago
should display higher levels of individual religious involvement than countries that deregulated
only recently, or than countries still regulating their religious economy. Therefore, the religious
market hypothesis involving the history of religious deregulation as it pertains to differences
between countries reads:
Hypothesis 2a: Individuals living in countries with a longer history of religious deregulation
attend religious services more often than individuals living in countries with
a shorter history of deregulation.
We already mentioned that the deregulation hypothesis is actually about the influence of
religious deregulation within countries on individual religious involvement within those same
countries. However, due to lack of data in previous research, the hypothesis on religious dereg-
ulation has often been tested on differences between countries (e.g., Chaves and Cann 1992;
Iannaccone 1991; Norris and Inglehart 2004). To make progress in this line of research, not only
individuals from different countries, but also individuals within the same country from different
eras should be compared. Hence, the hypothesis about the duration of religious deregulation
within a country reads:
1 In accordance with previous research, religious attendance is used to measure religious involvement. In contrast to
membership, attendance is a better indicator of devotion because it is less likely to be enforced or subject to national
sentiments (Martin 1978).
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Hypothesis 2b: The longer a country has deregulated its religious market, the more individ-
uals in this country will attend religious services.
A More Stringent Examination: Modernity and Religion
The effects of deregulation and duration on religious involvement as stated in hypotheses 1,
2a, and 2b might be confounded by other factors. A more stringent test of religious market
theory’s deregulation hypothesis, therefore, is to take plausible confounding factors into account.
One obvious and especially plausible confounding factor is modernity.
Modernity has profoundly changed our outlook and way of life. By means of mass education,
people have come in contact with a variety of ideas, and rising levels of income have given many
people more opportunities to choose among various lifestyles. These developments have given
rise to countries where modes of life differ socially, culturally, and religiously. To cope with the
diverse lifestyles of their inhabitants, the modern state can no longer recognize claims of exclusive
legitimacy by one particular religion or faith. Hence, as countries became more modern, they
have opened up their religious markets.
Not only did modernity give rise to religiously deregulated markets, modernity is also
thought to be corrosive to religious life (Berger 1967; Bruce 2002; Martin 1978, 1991; Wilson
1966). The technological advances of modernity foster a sense that people can shape their
own fate, independent of God. As a consequence, this increased sense of autonomy lowers
religious involvement. By controlling for the degree of modernity, we take into account possible
confounding effects of modernization on the relationship between religious deregulation and
religious involvement.
Additionally, to some extent the influence of modernity may in turn be complicated and
confounded by postcommunism since religion suffered greatly in former communist countries
(Smart 1998). This communist repression results in relatively low levels of both modernity
and church attendance, thereby suppressing the often-found negative association between the
Human Development Index (HDI) (a measure for modernity) and religious involvement (Norris
and Inglehart 2004). To properly estimate the effect of modernity on church attendance, in our
analyses we therefore also controlled for a nation’s (non)communist regime.
We furthermore included age and social economic status into our models to account for pos-
sible compositional influences. These individual characteristics might influence the relationship
between deregulation/duration and religious involvement as well. The elderly and people with
a relatively low social economic status have stronger religious involvement (e.g., Inglehart and
Baker 2000). As a result, countries with a relatively large proportion of elderly and/or individuals
with a low social economic status have, on average, higher church attendance rates.
DATA AND OPERATIONALIZATION
To test the religious market theory hypotheses, we constructed a repeated cross-sectional
data set from the European and World Value Surveys in 1981, 1990, 2000, and 2006, covering
26 European countries and North America. These four waves include identical questions about
religion. Only countries that were covered in at least two waves were selected.2 In addition, the
respondents selected were between 18 and 90 years of age. After a listwise deletion of missing
data on relevant variables, we developed a combined data set of 106,710 individuals distributed
2 Including Islamic, Asian, and Southern hemisphere countries was not feasible. Most of them were included in one
wave only. In addition, we lack statistical power to differentiate between these rather heterogeneous types of countries.
Therefore, we chose to exclude these countries and focus on a more or less homogeneous group of countries, i.e., North
America and Europe.
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Table 1: Respondents per country and wave
1981 1990 2000 2006 Total
Traditionally Catholic countries (n = 12)
Austria 0 1,431 1,515 0 2,946
Belgium 1,138 2,780 1,865 0 5,783
France 1,198 993 1,606 995 4,792
Hungary 0 998 992 0 1,990
Ireland 1,211 997 980 0 3,188
Italy 1,345 1,996 1,982 1,000 6,323
Malta 447 361 994 0 1,802
Poland 0 980 1,088 992 3,060
Portugal 0 1,185 996 0 2,181
Slovakia 0 1,585 1,327 0 2,912
Slovenia 0 1,011 987 1,007 3,005
Spain 2,297 4,131 2,385 1,177 9,990
Traditionally Orthodox countries (n = 4)
Bulgaria 0 1,017 994 986 2,997
Czech Republic 0 3,024 1,880 0 4,904
Republic of Moldova 0 0 1,008 1,043 2,051
Romania 0 1,100 1,135 1,762 3,997
Traditionally Protestant countries (n = 6)
Canada 1,254 1,723 1,913 2,109 6,999
Denmark 1,181 1,028 1,015 0 3,224
Finland 0 584 1,009 1,008 2,601
Iceland 927 699 965 0 2,591
Latvia 0 436 981 0 1,417
Sweden 914 981 1,013 1,002 3,910
Traditionally Mixed countries (n = 4)
Germany 1,301 3,430 2,023 2,012 8,766
Netherlands 1,198 1,012 999 942 4,151
United Kingdom of Great Britain 1,167 1,474 962 1,003 4,606
United States of America 2,310 1,820 1,198 1,196 6,524
17,888 36,776 33,812 18,234 106,710
Source: EVS & WVS (1981, 1990, 2000, 2006).
over 26 countries in the period 1981 to 2006. The distribution of respondents over countries
and waves is displayed in Table 1. Because we have hypotheses about the effect of religious
market characteristics on religious involvement of individuals covering multiple time points and
nations, we applied multilevel analysis (Duncan, Jones, and Moon 1996; Snijders and Bosker
1999). Three levels are distinguished. At the lowest and first level we have individuals (n =
106,710), the second level comprises all surveys within all countries (n = 80), and the third level
is composed of countries (n = 26).
Measuring Religious Involvement
Religious involvement was measured by religious attendance. People were asked how often
they attend religious services, apart from weddings, funerals, and festivities. Religious attendance
is recoded into two categories because of its skewed distribution. The category “does not attend”
is composed of people who never attend church or attend less than once a year. In total, 59 percent
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of the sample falls into this category. Individuals who do attend (41 percent of the sample) vary
considerably, ranging from holy days only to more than once a week; they all fall into the category
“attend religious services at least once a year.”
Measuring Religious Deregulation: Degree and Duration
Like Norris and Inglehart (2004), we measured religious deregulation using the degree
of religious freedom because deregulation implies that “the incentives and opportunities for
religious producers and viable options for religious consumers” are not confined in any sense
(Finke 1997:50). In other words, deregulation is the freedom for individuals to adhere or not to
adhere to whatever faith they desire, and for religious producers to have access to all possible
incentives and opportunities to establish themselves in the religious market.
Our time-scale measurement of religious deregulation is the number of years religious
freedom exists in a country. These data were derived from the records of the International
Coalition for Religious Freedom Archives (www.religiousfreedom.com). Because constitutions
are renewed every now and then, we calculated the number of years from the moment religious
freedom officially came into practice. If no year was available in the Religious Freedom records,
we examined the constitution or bill of rights for the necessary data. For some countries, no such
written constitution or bill of rights exists—for example, in the United Kingdom. In these cases,
we used as a starting point the year in which religious freedom was widely accepted because of
custom, common law, or legislation.
To examine whether a longer period of religious deregulation results in differences between
countries in levels of religious involvement, all countries between 1981 and 2000 were given
an average score for length or history of religious deregulation. For example, when a country
deregulated its religious market in 1890, it had experienced 91 years of deregulation by 1981 and
110 years by 2000. Hence, the average duration score for the 1981–2000 period is (91 + 110)/
2 = 100.5 years. The variation in average duration between countries is quite large, varying from
0 to 205.4 years.
Like any other market, it is unlikely that the influence of duration on involvement will
yield a linear course, since there may be floor effects (when the history of religious deregulation
is relatively short) and/or ceiling effects (when duration covers a relatively long period). For
example, it is quite likely that after 150 years of religious freedom, 50 more years will not matter
that much. We took these possible nonlinear effects into account in the analyses. For reasons of
convenience and interpretation, the variable history of religious deregulation is mean-centered in
the analyses.
In addition to our scale, we also use the Norris and Inglehart scale to measure the degree
of deregulation. In our data set, this scale ranges from 65 to 95, averaging 80.9.3 For reasons of
convenience and interpretation, the degree of religious freedom is mean-centered in the analyses.
To examine trends within countries between 1981 and 2006, all countries scored 0 on the
variable “years of religious deregulation since 1981” and, depending on the year religious freedom
came into practice, scored 0 or higher in subsequent surveys. For example, the Netherlands scored
0 in 1981 and scored 19 in 2000 because religious freedom started in 1848 and was not interrupted
between 1981 and 2000. In Slovakia, however, the score in the 1990 survey was 0, since it was
a communist country that banned religion. In 1993, its religious market became deregulated;
therefore, in the year 2000, seven years of uninterrupted religious freedom had passed, so Slovakia
3 Theoretically, the scale ranges from 20 to 100, with 20 meaning no religious freedom and 100 implying complete
religious freedom as explained in the Norris and Inglehart (2004) study. In our study, most countries rank relatively high
due to sample selection.
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scored 7. Since the difference between the first and the fourth wave of the WVS is 25 years, the
variation of duration since 1981 varies from 0 to 25 years.4
Initially, we included separation between state and religion (that is, state-supported religion)
in our analyses as well. However, this variable is strongly and positively correlated with “history
of religious deregulation” (0.701). This resulted in multicollinearity problems that obscured an
accurate interpretation of the actual relationships. In relation to this, the models lack statistical
power to include both variables (Snijders and Bosker 1999). Therefore, we chose to omit the
variable “state-supported religion.” We argue that religious deregulation—measured as years of
religious freedom—is more important. If religious freedom is constitutionally ensured, people are
free to choose and religious bodies are free to establish themselves in the religious market. This
does not necessarily imply that there is no state religion. However, with religious deregulation
(measured as years of religious freedom) some sort of free religious market is able to arise
regardless of whether or not a state supports/favors one religion. On a side note, a country can
have no state-supported religion but have no religious freedom as well. In this situation (which
is communism, and no communist nations are in our data set), people are not free to choose
religious involvement and churches cannot establish themselves in the religious market. Hence,
without religious freedom, a religious market where free-market principles apply cannot exist.
The Human Development Index
We chose the HDI as a measure for modernization. It indicates the level of development of
a country and the amount of options and autonomy for persons in a given country. The index
combines measures of life expectancy, literacy, educational attainment, and GDP per capita for
countries worldwide. In our data set, the HDI ranges from .71 to .93, with an average of .88. This
index was also used by Norris and Inglehart (2004) in their study. For reasons of convenience
and interpretation, HDI is also mean-centered in the analyses.
Compositional Influences: Individual-Level Variables
We also take into account compositional effects of age and social economic status (SES).
The latter is a standardized combination of educational attainment and income. Respondents
had to have a valid score on education and/or income to determine their social economic status.
Ranging from 0 to 2, the average SES is .93. The variable SES has fewer observations than
the other variables, due to missing data on this variable for Sweden in 1990, and some random
missing data for other countries and years. Since SES is an ordinal scale, we also included
dummy indicators including a dummy for missing cases. However, this strategy did not affect the
results. For reasons of parsimony, we therefore report SES as a scale. The average respondent
was 44 years old. Table 2 shows the descriptives of the variables included in our analyses.
ANALYSIS
General Patterns of Religious Deregulation
Using multilevel analysis, we first estimated a random intercept model. In this model, the
intercept turned out to have significant random components, indicating that church attendance
varies over both survey waves and countries. The results are displayed in Table 3. Model 1 tests
4 The variable “years of deregulation since 1981” is rather similar to the variable “survey sweep” but not equal (Peason’s
correlation coefficient = .874). We will address this issue further at the before-last paragraph of the analysis section.
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Degree of religious deregulation 65–95 81.15 8.98
History of religious deregulation (in years) 0–205 58.83 68.29
HDI .71–.93 .87 .06
Postcommunist 0/1 .35 .49
Country-wave level variables:b
Years of religious deregulation since 1981 0–25 11.25 8.78
Individual level variables:c
Religious attendance 0/1 .59 .49
Age 18–90 44.58 17.34
SES (social economic status)d 0–2 .93 .73
Source: EVS & WVS (1981, 1990, 2000, 2006).
a = Means and standard deviations are calculated averages over all 26 countries.
b = Means and standard deviations are calculated averages over all 80 country-wave combinations.
c = Averages and standard deviations are calculated over all 106,710 individuals.
d = Calculated over 95,290 individuals (this includes 79 country-wave combinations, missing the entire 1990 Sweden
sweep, and some random missings for other country-wave combinations).
whether a higher degree of deregulation between countries results in higher levels of attendance.
Like Norris and Inglehart (2004), we find no evidence that a higher degree of deregulation results
in higher levels of attendance.
To test whether the duration of deregulation between countries affects levels of attendance
in a positive way, the history of religious deregulation (in years) was added in Model 2. Contrary
to religious market theory, findings show that in countries with a longer history of religious
deregulation, people do not have a significantly higher probability to attend religious services
compared to people living in countries with a shorter record of religious deregulation.
It is important to note that we also tested the rivaling secularization hypothesis (i.e., more
deregulation leads to less involvement) and found the negative parameter estimate in Model 2
to be significant (one-tailed p < .01). In other words, as the history of religious deregulation
lasts longer, the probability to attend declines, and this is clearly in line with predictions of
secularization theory (Bruce 2002; Martin 1991).
As stated earlier, the process of religious deregulation may have its own setbacks, but
eventually it results in higher levels of religious involvement (Stark and Iannaccone 1994). We
therefore checked whether a nonlinear effect of a country’s history of religious deregulation on
involvement existed, but no such influence was found. This is rather striking because in some
countries deregulation has been going on for decades if not centuries, and we would expect the
influence of deregulation to flatten off. For now, no support for hypothesis 2a is found.
In Model 3, the duration of religious deregulation within countries is examined. If the
deregulation hypothesis of religious market theory is correct, the longer a country has dereg-
ulated its religious market, the more individuals in this country will attend religious services
(hypothesis 2b) This is a time-related specification of the deregulation hypothesis 2a. Findings
show that “years of religious deregulation since 1981” has no significant negative relation with
attendance. Hence, hypothesis 2b is not supported either. In Model 4, we checked for possible
start-up costs or saturation effects for “years of religious deregulation since 1981,” and again we
cannot detect a significant nonlinear effect.
Models 5 and 6 include possible interaction effects. It might well be that in countries with
a longer history of religious deregulation, the influence of the degree of deregulation follows
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a different path than in countries that have only recently opened up their religious markets.
Additionally, according to religious market theory, the positive effect of the degree of religious
freedom on attendance should be stronger when religious deregulation within a country lasted
longer, that is, years of religious deregulation since 1981. However, as Models 5 and 6 reveal, no
evidence favoring either of these interaction hypotheses is found.
A More Stringent Test: Modernity and Postcommunism
We originally wanted to examine whether the expected relationship between deregulation
and involvement is (to some extent) confounded by modernity. To do so, we included the HDI,
as an indicator of modernity, into the analysis. Modernity is presumed to influence both religious
regulation and involvement negatively. If so, the relationship between deregulation and involve-
ment could weaken or even disappear. Next, it is also important to consider postcommunism as
a possible suppressor effect of modernity. Religion suffered greatly in countries that were com-
munist (Smart 1998), leading to relatively low church attendance in former communist countries
despite an also relatively low HDI coefficient. This consequence might suppress the often-found
negative association between HDI and religious involvement (Norris and Inglehart 2004).To take
this suppressor effect into account, we included next to modernity a fixed dummy effect for
postcommunism. Finally, it is highly likely that both secularization processes and market effects
exist simultaneously. Therefore, the deregulation of the market might become significant if we
control for modernity.
As Model 7 shows, HDI and postcommunism both have a significant, negative effect on
attendance. More interesting is that the parameter estimate for the degree of religious deregulation
becomes larger and significant. Note that the negative influence of HDI is much larger than the
positive effect of deregulation, resulting in a net decline in church attendance.5 Although both
theories seem to apply simultaneously, modernization corrodes church attendance to a larger
extent than deregulation can stimulate church attendance.
Last, in Models 8 and 9, we included the individual variables age and social status to take
into account compositional effects. These models show that age and social-economic status
are significantly and positively related to religious involvement.6 Additionally, the individual
characteristics do not considerably affect the effects of level-2 and level-3 variables. We even
found a negative effect of years of deregulation since 1981 in Models 8 and 9, when testing the
rivaling secularization hypothesis.
One might wonder what the trend in church attendance is in all countries given that degree of
secularization has a positive effect while modernization has a negative effect on church attendance.
Table 4 shows trends for all countries.7 In the period 1981 to 2006, on average, church attendance
5 To give a concrete sense of the relative size of the effect of the degree of religious deregulation versus HDI, we computed
the predicted change in the percentage of individuals who attend church at least once a year. For these computations,
we took an increase from the 10th to the 90th percentile, while all other variables are mean-centered and kept constant.
According to Models 7 through 9 (see Table 4), an increase from the 10th to the 90th percentile in the degree of religious
deregulation (i.e., from 68.5 up to 95.0) makes the percentage of church attendees increase from 60 percent to 77 percent
(change: +17). By contrast, a 10th–90th percentile increase of HDI (from .79 to .92) leads to a decrease from 85 percent
to 54 percent (change: −31).
6 Some may argue that in countries with a longer record of deregulation, the elderly are exposed to influences of
deregulation for a longer period of time than youngsters, and are therefore more devout. However, no such interaction
between deregulation and age was found. This means that effects of deregulation on attendance are similar for all ages in
all the countries analyzed, irrespective of their record of deregulation.
7 Since floor and ceiling effects are conceivable, we used logistic regression to estimate a trend parameter. At the individual
level, we used the following logistic equation: log(p1/(1–p1) = a + b1∗wave. In this equation, p1 is the probability of
scoring 1 on church attendance, and b1 is the trend parameter indicating whether church attendance became increased
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Table 4: Percentage of people attending religious services at least once a year per country and
wave, in percentages and estimated decennial, log linear trends (cf. footnote 7)
Year
Religious
1981 1990 2000 2006 Change Freedom
Traditionally Catholic countries (n = 12)
Austria na 67.4 68.4 na .05 1867
Belgium 50.0 51.8 49.7 na −.02 1831
France 34.1 40.9 33.0 32.5 −.06∗ 1789
Hungary na 51.6 44.6 na −.28∗∗∗ 1972
Ireland 92.8 95.2 89.2 na −.26∗∗∗ 1937
Italy 73.8 79.8 83.0 83.3 .25∗∗∗ 1948
Malta 95.7 91.7 94.0 na −.11 1964
Poland na 92.6 91.1 92.4 −.03 1988
Portugal na 59.9 66.6 na .29∗∗∗
Slovakia na 61.7 67.4 na .25∗∗∗ 1993
Slovenia na 63.4 62.3 63.7 .00 1991
Spain 67.4 59.7 56.5 41.4 −.34∗∗∗ 1978
Traditionally Orthodox countries (n = 4)
Bulgaria na 36.5 66.1 62.9 .74∗∗∗ 1949
Czech Republic na 35.4 35.4 na −.01 1992
Republic of Moldova na na 84.1 74.9 −.96∗∗∗ 1991
Romania na 85.6 90.0 79.9 −.28∗∗∗ 1991
Traditionally Protestant countries (n = 6)
Canada 68.2 64.6 65.0 59.3 −.13∗∗∗ 1982
Denmark 42.8 42.5 50.0 na .15∗∗∗ –
Finland na 50.0 52.2 54.8 .12∗ 1870
Iceland 52.0 55.1 56.9 na .10∗ 1944
Latvia na 53.4 57.3 na .16
Sweden 45.5 33.7 41.3 33.8 −.13∗∗∗ 1975
Traditionally Mixed countries (n = 4)
Germany 58.3 51.7 47.6 42.8 −.23∗∗∗ 1918
Netherlands 53.7 52.7 45.6 39.1 −.23∗∗∗ 1848
United Kingdom of Great Britain 40.6 44.3 35.6 42.7 −.02 1871
United States of America 76.5 74.2 78.4 61.1 −.21∗∗∗ 1789
Source: EVS & WVS (1981, 1990, 2000, 2006).
na = no data available, ∗∗∗p < .01; ∗∗p < .05; ∗p < .10 (all two-tailed).
levels decreased significantly in 11 countries, increased significantly in seven countries, and
remained quite stable in eight countries. Although secularization seems to dominate, one simply
cannot ignore the increases in seven countries.
In sum, the general pattern is that the degree of religious deregulation has initially no
significant positive influence on church attendance in European countries and North America
in the 1981–2006 period. However, when the level of modernity and postcommunism is taken
into account, the degree of deregulation increases from .021 to .030 and becomes significantly
positive. However, its influence is completely counteracted by modernization in the Western
(positive b) or decreased (negative b) over the years. Note that the variable wave is a metric measure with four categories:
1981, 1990, 2000, and 2006.
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nations analyzed here. Modernity proves to be corrosive to religious life, as thought by some
secularization theorists (Berger 1967; Bruce 2002; Martin 1978, 1991; Wilson 1966). In other
words, even though free religious markets in the West temper the corrosive influence of modernity
somewhat, this counterbalance is not substantial enough to fully counteract the profound negative
impact modernity has on religious involvement.
Furthermore, our findings do not support hypotheses 2a and 2b; duration of deregulation
has no positive significant effect on involvement. Although the history of religious deregulation
differs from country to country, individuals living in countries that have had a deregulated religious
market for decades do not have a greater inclination to attend religious services than individuals
living in countries with a shorter history of deregulation.
Moreover, not only do individuals differ in their choice to attend church between countries
but also within countries. This is important because the deregulation hypothesis is foremost a
hypothesis pertaining to individuals within a religious market (which is mostly confined within
a country). Our findings show that within countries individual religious involvement does not
increase as the period of deregulation continues in those very countries.
CONCLUSION
This study examined to what extent the duration and degree of religious deregulation explains
differences in religious involvement of citizens in Europe and North America. Differences be-
tween countries and trends within countries were examined to test the deregulation hypothesis of
religious market theory. This study revealed some findings in line with, and others contradicting,
religious market theory.
For differences between Western European and Northern American countries, we found
corroboration for the hypothesized effect of the degree of deregulation: when controlling for
modernity, degree of deregulation has a significant positive effect on church attendance. Note
that we also found a corroding influence of modernization on attendance for this set of Western
countries, which backs a cardinal point of secularization theory (Berger 1967; Bruce 2002; Martin
1978, 1991; Wilson 1966). Furthermore, this effect is quite strong, so even when the positive
effect of the degree of deregulation on involvement is working, the religious revival as predicted
by religious market theory will not emerge because modernity totally counters the influences of
deregulation (Stark 1997). Next, we found that the history of religious deregulation had no positive
influence on individual attendance. We even found a significant negative effect in Model 2, when
testing the rivaling secularization hypothesis. The absence of a significant positive influence poses
a serious challenge for religious market theory, which states that individuals in countries with a
longer history of religious deregulation show higher levels of attendance than individuals living
in countries with a shorter history of deregulation.
The null results obtained by Norris and Inglehart (2004) and the weak positive results we
found using Norris and Inglehart’s scale (the degree of deregulation) are consistent with each other.
In their analysis using simple Pearsons’s correlation without prior controls, the effect of religious
freedom has the same positive association with involvement although not significant. Furthermore,
the differences in significance might be due to differing selection of nations. Norris and Inglehart
selected 21 postindustrial countries whereas we selected 26 Northern American and European
countries. The same applies for the strong degenerative influence of modernization (HDI) on
religious involvement. Norris and Inglehart’s choice to select only postindustrial countries might
conceal the influence of modernization.
Within countries, we found no evidence that the duration of religious deregulation positively
affects religious involvement. Instead, we even found a negative effect in Models 8 and 9 when
testing the rivaling secularization hypothesis. This again is troublesome for religious market
theory as the deregulation hypothesis of religious market theory primarily pertains to trends
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within countries (Stark and Finke 2000). Religious market theory predicts that a revival in
religious involvement would happen in Europe when the state created a free market for religion,
forcing religious organizations into competition for customers (Stark and Finke 2000). From the
data examined, we conclude that this does not seem to be happening today nor has it happened
in the past decades.
Although it is likely that religious deregulation may take different pathways in countries
with diverse religious heritages, we did not take that into account for two reasons. First, religious
market theory explains religious variation on the basis of a variety of settings, across time and
place (Stark and Iannaccone 1994; Stark and Finke 2000), but does not distinguish between
settings with different religious traditions (e.g., Stark and Finke 2000). Our current theory is
concerned with the structure of the religious market—regulation, total diversity, market shares,
and competition—not the dominant religious signature of the religious market. It does not take
into account whether a geographical area is predominantly Catholic, Protestant, Islamic, or some
other religious tradition. The second reason is methodological. As the focus of this study is
to simultaneously test between countries and trends within those countries, reliable data were
available for 26 nations only. Hence, we lacked the statistical power necessary to differentiate
between countries with different dominate religious heritages (Achen 2005; Snijders and Bosker
1999). Although the inclusion of more waves per nation and including more, especially non-
Western, nations is favorable for more reliable trend estimates, we think the time span we
considered was large enough to investigate whether religious deregulation does raise levels of
individual religious involvement.
In sum, to the extent that the degree and duration of a free, deregulated religious market
explains differences in religious involvement between and within various European and Northern
American countries in the 1981 to 2006 period, our study found some support for the claims of
religious market theory. Even so, most of our findings were troubling for religious market theory
and, indeed, do not support the deregulation hypothesis. In religious markets where the clergy
have to make an effort to attract and bind members, it is not evident that more individuals attend
religious services. (Before we draw this conclusion, we should state that we did not test the basic
assumption that clergy does, indeed, become more active in a deregulated market.) Basically, the
religious picture of most European and Northern American countries that emerges from our study
is that of continuous secularization somewhat tempered by the degree of deregulation.
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